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The first part of this Article, State Income Taxation of Multiuris-
dictional Corporations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, andH A 5076,'
did not contemplate a sequel. The Supreme Court's decisions last
term in two state corporate income tax cases, however, created an
irresistible opportunity to write one. The Court's opinions in
ASARC0 2 and Woolworth3 picked up where its opinions in Mobil4
and Exxon5 left off. Yet the direction taken by these more recent
decisions veers sharply from the course ostensibly set by their prede-
cessors. This Article will consider the Court's latest pronouncements
in this area in a continuing if quixotic effort to discover where they
may be leading. After analyzing the Court's decisions in ASARCO
and Woolworth against the background of the uniform state law
from which they arose, the Article explores the framework of state
income taxation of multijurisdictional corporations in the wake of
these decisions.
I. THE DECISIONS INAS,4RCO AND WOOLWORTH
A. The Federal Constitutional and State Statutory Background
Most states impose a broad-based tax upon the income of corpo-
rations doing business within their borders. 6 When the states apply
such a tax to income generated by activities carried on across state
lines, the strictures of the commerce and due process clauses compel
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. A.B. 1967, Harvard University, J.D.
1970, University of Chicago.-Ed.
1. Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multiurisdictional Corporations: Reylections on
Mobil, Exxon, andlH. 5076, 79 MIcH. L. Rv. 113 (1980).
2. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982).
3. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 102 S. Ct 3128 (1982).
4. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
5. Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
6. 1 ST. TAX GuaDE (CCH) 662 (June 1982).
Michigan Law Review
them to confine their taxing power to income fairly attributable to
activities carried on within the state.7 As elaborated in the first in-
stallment of this Article, the Supreme Court in Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes8 and Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue9
examined these strictures in opinions that delineated the constitu-
tional limitations on the state's power to include income in a corpo-
ration's apportionable tax base. In Mobil, the Court held that
neither the due process nor commerce clause prohibited a state from
including in the apportionable tax base of a nondomiciliary corpora-
tion the dividends it received from foreign subsidiaries and affiliates
with which it was conducting a unitary business carried on in part in
the taxing state. In Exxon, the Court held that neither the due pro-
cess nor commerce clause prohibited a state from including in the
.apportionable tax base of a nondomiciliary corporation all of the
operating income it derived from its unitary business carried on in
part in the taxing state.
Mobil announced, and Exxon repeated, the fundamental propo-
sition underlying both decisions: "[T]he linchpin of apportionability
in the field of state income taxation is the unitary-business princi-
ple."10 "In accord with this principle," the Court declared in Mobil,
what appellant must show, in order to establish that its dividend in-
come is not subject to an apportioned tax in Vermont, is that the in-
come was earned in the course of activities unrelated to the sale of
petroleum products in that State.II
Because Mobil did not attempt to meet this burden, "Vermont was
entitled to conclude that the dividend income's foreign source did
not destroy the requisite nexus with in-state activities."12 The Court
clearly indicated, however, that some dividend income remained be-
yond the reach of the states' tax power.' 3
In Exxon, the Court reiterated Mobil's assertion that "[t]he
'linchpin of apportionability' for state income taxation of an inter-
state enterprise is the 'unitary-business principle,' a14 and it repeated
7. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
8. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
9. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
10. 445 U.S. at 439; see 447 U.S. at 223.
11. 445 U.S. at 439.
12. 445 U.S. at 439-40.
13. We do not mean to suggest that all dividend income received by corporations operat-
ing in interstate commerce is necessarily taxable in each State where that corporation does
business. Where the business activities of the dividend payor have nothing to do with the
activities of the recipient in the taxing State, due process considerations might well pre-
clude apportionability, because there would be no underlying unitary business.
445 U.S. at 441-42.




[i]n order to exclude certain income from the apportionment formula,
the company must prove that "the income was earned in the course of
activities unrelated to the sale of petroleum products in that State."
The court looks to the "underlying economic realities of a unitary busi-
ness," and the income must derive from "unrelated business activity"
which constitutes a "discrete business enterprise."'I s
After reviewing the facts, the Court concluded that Exxon's overall
operations constituted a unitary business carried on in part in the
taxing state. Exxon had failed to demonstrate that its separate func-
tional departments were "discrete business enterprises."'16 All of its
operating income was, therefore, properly includable in its appor-
tionable tax base.
Despite the critical importance the Court attributed to the uni-
tary business principle in Mobil and Exxon, neither case compelled
the Court to flesh out the concept. In Mobil, the taxpayer never ad-
dressed, and hence all but conceded, the unitary business issue be-
cause of its (ultimately misguided) belief that "the existence or non-
existence of a unitary relationship between Mobil and corporations
which paid the.., dividends at issue is irrelevant."' 17 In Exxon, the
unitary business issue presented little difficulty because the Court
was confronted with a vertically integrated enterprise where
products flowed from wellhead to gas pump, where services were
readily transferred between divisions, and where there was "an um-
brella of centralized management and controlled interaction."'18
In its latest term, by contrast, the Court faced much thornier uni-
tary business issues that all parties squarely addressed.' 9 ASARCO
Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission20 involved a constitutional chal-
lenge to Idaho's power to include within a nondomiciliary corpora-
tion's apportionable tax base income from intangibles (dividends,
interest, and capital gains) received from subsidiary corporations
which, unlike the parent, did no business in the taxing state. F W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Deartment2 ' involved a
constitutional challenge to New Mexico's power to include within a
nondomiciliary corporation's apportionable tax base income from
15. 447 U.S. at 223-24 (citations omitted) (quoting Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439, 441, 442).
16. 447 U.S. at 224 (quoting Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439).
17. Appellant's Reply Brief at 4, Mobil; see Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 121-30.
18. 447 U.S. at 224; see Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 141-5 1.
19. In addition to the parties, numerous amici curiae filed briefs in the two cases, including
the Multistate Tax Commission, whose construction of UDITPA was implicitly at issue.
20. 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982).
21. 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982).
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intangibles (dividends) received from subsidiary corporations which,
unlike the parent, did no business in the taxing state.22 The underly-
ing question was no longer whether income derived from constituent
parts of a vertically integrated enterprise was includable in its appor-
tionable tax base by the state in which the enterprise sold its prod-
ucts - the essential unitary business issue in both Mobil and Exxon.
Rather, the question was whether income received by a nondomicil-
iary enterprise doing business in the taxing state from corporations
with which it was not vertically integrated was includable in the en-
terprise's apportionable tax base when it held substantial ownership
interests in and enjoyed a variety of working relationships with such
corporations. This basic question raised a host of related issues:
What were the precise criteria among the many commonly ad-
vanced2 and beyond those hitherto offered by the Court24 for deter-
mining whether a business was unitary? What were the facts, short
of vertical integration, that carry special weight in making such a
determination? In the context of income from intangibles, is it the
relationship between the payor and payee's activities that governs
the unitary business issue or can the payee's own relationship to the
intangibles, as distinguished from its relationship to the underlying
corporate entities, be considered part of the payee's unitary business
justifying inclusion of the income in its apportionable tax base? And
if the income is apportionable, must some adjustment be made in the
formula employed to apportion the income to the taxing state in or-
der to comply with the due process requirement that "the income
attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to
'values connected with the taxing State' "?25
The constitutional conflicts in ASARCO and Woolworth
originated in analogous disputes between the parties under state law.
Like a majority of the states imposing corporate income taxes, Idaho
and New Mexico have sought to discharge their constitutional obli-
gation to tax only income fairly attributable to activities carried on
within the state by enacting the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act (UDITPA).26 UDITPA provides rules for determining
22. Woolworth also raised the question whether New Mexico could constitutionally in-
clude in Woolworth's apportionable tax base a sum Woolworth was required to report as in-
come on its federal tax return in order to claim a foreign tax credit with respect to taxes paid
by its foreign subsidiaries. See text at notes 125-27 infra.
23. See Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 149.
24. Id. at 148-51.
25. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978); see Hellerstein, supra note 1, at
127-30.
26. Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 7A U.L.A. 91 (1978) [hereinafter
cited without cross-reference as UDITPA]; IDAHO CODE § 63-3027 (Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT.
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the portion of a multijurisdictional corporation's income that a state
may tax.
UDITPA solves the problem of dividing a multijurisdictional
corporation's income among the states either by apportioning it
among the states by formula or by allocating it to a particular state.27
Whether income is apportionable or allocable depends on the statu-
tory distinction between "business income" ("income arising from
transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade
or business") 28 and "non-business income" ("all income other than
business income"). 29 Business income is apportionable; nonbusiness
income is allocable. Under UDITPA, business income is appor-
tioned by the familiar three-factor formula that apportions to the
taxing state a percentage of the taxpayer's income equal to the aver-
age of three ratios: the ratio of the taxpayer's in-state property to its
total property, of its in-state payroll to its total payroll, and of its in-
state receipts to its total receipts.30 Nonbusiness income is allocated
to the particular state or states that UDITPA designates for specific
types of nonbusiness income.31
The constitutional controversies in ASA4RCO and Woolworth -
whether the income at issue arose out of a unitary business con-
ducted in the taxing state - mirrored the state law questions they
raised under UDITPA - whether the income in dispute was busi-
ness or nonbusiness income. While the Supreme Court necessarily
limited its decisions to the federal constitutional questions, their im-
plications are likely to be reflected in state court and agency interpre-
tations of UDITPA where these issues generally are first confronted.
It is therefore appropriate to begin the discussion of these cases with
a brief description of the state administrative and judicial proceed-
ings, which focused on UDITPA.
ANN. §§ 7-4-1 to -21 (Replacement Pamphlet 1981); see 7A U.L.A. 10 (Supp. 1982); ST. &
Loc. TAX SERV. (P-H) (All States Unit) 1046 (1979).
27. As to the distinction between specific allocation and formulary apportionment and
other general considerations relating to the methods employed by the states for dividing the
income of multijurisdictional corporations, see Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 116-18.
28. UDITPA § I; IDAHO CODE § 63-3027(a)(1) (Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-4-2(A)
(Replacement Pamphlet 1981).
29. UDITPA § l(e); IDAHO CODE § 63-3027(a)(4) (Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-4-
2(D) (Replacement Pamphlet 1981).
30. UDITPA §§ 9-17; IDAHO CODE §§ 63-3027(i)-(q) (Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-
4-10 to -18 (Replacement Pamphlet 1981).
31. UDITPA §§ 4-8; IDAHO CODE §§ 63-3027(d)-(h) (Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-
4-5 to -9 (Replacement Pamphlet 1981).
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B. The State Administrative and Judicial Proceedings
1. The Proceedings Below in ASARCO
ASARCO, the erstwhile American Smelting and Refining Com-
pany, engages in the business of mining, smelting, refining, and sell-
ing nonferrous metals. It is incorporated in New Jersey, maintains
its headquarters and commercial domicile in New York, and con-
ducts business in many states and abroad. ASARCO's principal ac-
tivity in Idaho is the mining of silver. ASARCO's other activities in
the state include the mining of lead and zinc, the operation of a re-
gional administrative office, and the sale of secondary materials.
During the years at issue, 1968 through 1970, ASARCO received
substantial income from its ownership and sale of intangible prop-
erty. The controversy between the parties focused on the receipt of
such income from ASARCO's interests in five other corporations,
none of which conducted any business in Idaho: M.I.M. Holdings,
Ltd., which was 53 percent owned by ASARCO, engaged in the pro-
duction and processing of nonferrous metals in Australia and Eng-
land; General Cable Corp., which was 34 percent owned by
ASARCO, manufactured cable; Revere Copper and Brass, Inc.,
which was 34 percent owned by ASARCO, manufactured copper
products; ASARCO Mexicana, S.A., which was 49 percent owned by
ASARCO, carried on in Mexico the same general type of business
that ASARCO carries on in the United States; and Southern Peru
Copper Corp., which was 51.5 percent owned by ASARCO, pro-
duced and smelted copper in Peru. ASARCO received dividends
from all five corporations. It received interest on Revere's converti-
ble debentures, on a note acquired in connection with an earlier sale
of Mexicana stock, and on a note acquired in connection with a 1970
sale of General Cable stock. It received capital gains from the sale
of General Cable and M.I.M. stock. The amounts involved aver-
aged over $50 million on an annual basis.
In filing its Idaho tax returns for the years in question, ASARCO
took the position that none of its income from intangibles should be
included in its apportionable tax base.32 While conceding that its
operating income should be apportioned as business income under
UDITPA,33 ASARCO believed that its income from intangibles, in
32. Jurisdictional Statement at 7, ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comn., 102 S. Ct.
3103 (1982).
33. For the tax year 1968, ASARCO originally took the position that its income should be
attributed to the state by separate accounting. Joint Appendix at 26a, ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho
-State Tax Conimn., 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982); see Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 117. It subse-
quently agreed to apportion its operating income for that year, consistently with its treatment
[Vol. 81:157
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particular its dividend, interest, and capital gain income, 34 should be
treated as nonbusiness income under UDITPA and allocated to its
commercial domicile, New York.35 ASARCO based its stance on
the view that its income from intangibles failed to satisfy Idaho's
version of UDITPA's definition of business income:
"Business income" means income arising from transactions and ac-
tivity in the regular course of the taxpayers' trade or business and in-
cludes income from the acquisition, management, or disposition of
tangible and intangible property when such acquisition, management,
or disposition constitute integral or necessary parts of the taxpayers'
trade or business operations.36
In 1971, the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) completed a
joint audit of ASARCO's tax returns for the years at issue on behalf
of Idaho and five other states. 37 The MTC auditor recommended,
among other things, 38 that the dividends, interest, and capital gains
received by ASARCO from the five corporations mentioned above
of such income for 1969 and 1970. See Jurisdictional Statement at 7 n.8; Joint Appendix at
26a.
* 34. ASARCO also had income from royalities which it treated as nonbusiness income.
Joint Appendix at 26a.
35. See UDITPA §§ 6(c), 7; IDAHO CODE § 63-3027(f)(3), (g) (Supp. 1982).
36. IDAHO CODE § 63-3027(a)(1) (Supp. 1982). UDITPA's definition of "business in-
come," UDITPA § l(a), differs from the Idaho definition in two respects: it does not contain
the phrase "or necessary" after "integral" in the sentence quoted in the text; nor does it contain
the following sentence, which appears in the Idaho Code, creating a presumption that certain
income from intangibles is business income:
Gains or losses and dividend and interest income from stock and securities of foreign or
domestic corporations shall be presumed to be income from intangible property, the ac-
quisition, management, or disposition of which constitute an integral part of the taxpay-
ers' trade or business; such presumption may only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.
IDAHO CODE § 63-3027(a)(1) (Supp. 1982).
37. Multistate Tax Commission Audit Report, reprintedin Joint Appendix 83a. The Mul-
tistate Tax Commission is the administrative agency of the Multistate Tax Compact, of which
Idaho is a member. IDAHO CODE § 63-3701 (1976). Article VIII of the Compact authorizes
the MTC to perform interstate audits on behalf of member states. The constitutionality of the
Compact and its joint audit provisions was upheld in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Commn., 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
38. The MTC auditor recommended that ASARCO and six of its wholly owned subsidiar-
ies be combined and treated as a single corporation for tax purposes. Multistate Tax Commis-
sion Audit Report, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 87a. The auditor justified his
recommendation by pointing to ASARCO's majority ownership of each of the subsidiaries, its
conduct of a vertically integrated nonferrous metals business with them, its maintenance of
interlocking officers and directors with the subsidiaries, the flow of products among the compa-
nies as evidenced by intercompany sales, and the flow of services among the companies. Mul-
tistate Tax Commission Audit Report, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 88a-91a. As a result of
this combined treatment, the dividends that the subsidiaries paid to ASARCO would be disre-
garded as intracompany transfers, and the collective operating income of the combined group
of corporations would be apportioned on the basis of a formula that reflected the property,
payroll, and receipts factors of the entire group. On the combined report, see Hellerstein,
supra note 1, at 123 and sources cited therein.
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be classified as business income and apportioned under UDITPA.3 9
The Idaho State Tax Commission embraced this recommendation,
concluding that the income in question was properly classified as
business income under UDITPA because it was "received in the reg-
ular course of [ASARCO's] trade or business and arose from trans-
actions and activities in the regular course of such trade or
business."' 4 The state trial court overturned the state tax commis-
sion's determination. 41 It found instead that the income should be
allocated to New York, ASARCO's commercial domicile, because
[t]he income described does not come from property or activities which
is [sic] an integral part of the taxpayer's trade or business .... It ap-
pears to the court that if the dividend income from other corporations
is an integral part of the business of the plaintiff that they should be
unitized [ie., combined] and all matters considered and if they are not
that the income is not business income but is nonbusiness income.42
The Supreme Court of Idaho in turn reversed the district court
and held that the disputed income ASARCO received from the five
corporations in question was business income apportionable under
UDITPA.43 It rebuffed constitutional objections to this conclusion,
dismissing challenges both to the apportionability of the income as
well as to the formula employed to apportion it. On ASARCO's
appeal of this determination, the Supreme Court of the United States
vacated the state court's judgment and remanded the case "for fur-
ther consideration in light of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes... ."44 On remand, the Idaho Supreme Court reinstated its
original opinion in a brief order which explained only that "it is the
conclusion of this Court that our prior opinion and order are consis-
tent with both Mobil Oil and the more recent decision in Exxon
39. Multistate Tax Commission Audit Report, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 92a-96a.
Under UDITPA, ASARCO's business income, including its business income from intangibles,
would be apportioned on the basis of a formula that reflected the property, payroll, and re.-
ceipts factors of ASARCO. The formula would not take account of the property, payroll, or
receipts factors of the corporations from which ASARCO derived its business income from
intangibles. This separate company approach to the taxation of income from intangibles is to
be contrasted with the combined approach. See note 38 supra; Hellerstein, supra note 1, at
123-24.
40. Inre Petition for Redetermination of Income Tax Deficiency by American Smelting &
Refining Company (ASARCO), reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement app. 46a, 53a-54a, 58a.
41. American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., No. 53182 (Dist. Ct.
of Ada County, Nov. 13, 1975), reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement app. at 36a.
42. Jurisdictional Statement app. at 37a.
43. American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., 99 Idaho 924, 592
P.2d 39 (1979).
44. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., 445 U.S. 939 (1980) (mem.), vacating and
remanding 99 Idaho 924, 592 P.2d 39 (1979).
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Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. ofRevenue . . . . 45 ASARCO once again
appealed to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.46
2. The Proceedings Below in Woolworth
F. W. Woolworth Company engages in the general retail mer-
chandise business throughout the United States, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands. It purchases a variety of consumer goods and
sells them at retail through Woolworth and Woolco stores.47 Its
principal place of business and commercial domicile are located in
New York, where it is incorporated. During the tax year at issue
(1976-77), Woolworth's retail sales in New Mexico exceeded $13
million.
Woolworth, like ASARCO, received substantial income from the
ownership of intangible property. The dispute centered on the $40
million in dividends that Woolworth received from four of its for-
eign subsidiaries:48 F. W. Woolworth G.m.b.H., a wholly owned
German subsidiary; F. W. Woolworth, Ltd., a wholly owned Cana-
dian subsidiary; F. W. Woolworth Co., S.A. de C.V. Mexico, a whol-
ly owned Mexican subsidiary; and F. W. Woolworth Co., Ltd., a 52.7
percent owned English subsidiary. These subsidiaries conduct the
same general type of business in their respective countries as Wool-
worth conducts in the United States.
In filing its New Mexico tax return for the year in question,
Woolworth, like ASARCO, took the position that none of its divi-
dends should be included in its apportionable tax base.49 Like
ASARCO, Woolworth conceded that its operating income should be
apportioned under UDITPA but insisted that its dividend income
should be classified as nonbusiness income under UDITPA and allo-
45. American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., 102 Idaho 38, 624
P.2d 946 (1981).
46. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., 102 S. Ct. 87 (1981) (mem.).
47. On September 24, 1982, Woolworth announced that it would -close all of its 336
Woolco discount stores in early 1983 because of persistent losses from their operations. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 25, 1982, at 21, col 3.
48. In addition, the parties disagreed over the appropriate treatment of Woolworth's divi-
dend "gross-up" required to be reported as federal taxable income in order to receive credit for
foreign taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries, I.R.C. §§ 78, 901(a), 902(a) (1976); see note 22supra,
as well as its treatment of a foreign exchange gain from a hedging transaction in British
pounds. The "gross-up" issue will be discussed separately below. See text at notes 125-27
infra. The foreign currency issue, which was not addressed by either of the state appellate
courts and was not raised by Woolworth in the Supreme Court, will be ignored.
49. Jurisdictional Statement at 6-7, F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept.,
102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982); see text at note 32 supra.
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cated to its commercial domicile, New York.50 On audit, the New
Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, like the Idaho State Tax
Commission, classified the taxpayer's dividend income as business
income apportionable under UDITPA.51
In the state courts, the parallelism between the Woolworth and
ASARCO cases continued. The first judicial tribunal to consider the
issue, the New Mexico Court of Appeals, determined that the divi-
dend income was not apportionable business income under
UDITPA because in its judgment there was, among other things, "no
indication that the income from Woolworth's long-standing invest-
ments [in its subsidiaries] was used either in taxpayer's unitary do-
mestic business or in its business conducted in New Mexico." 52 The
Supreme Court of New Mexico, like the Supreme Court of Idaho,
overturned the lower state court ruling.5 3 It found "substantial evi-
dence" to support the Revenue and Taxation Department's determi-
nation that the dividends were business income under UDITPA
because "[tlhe income arose from activities of Woolworth in the reg-
ular course of its business,"' 54 "[t]he income was acquired and man-
aged as an integral part of its regular business operations,"55 and
"Ithe purpose for acquiring and holding the stock is related to its
business operations. s56 The court disposed of constitutional objec-
tions to its conclusion relying on the Supreme Court's opinions in
Mobil and Exxon. 57 When Woolworth appealed, the Court noted
probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument in tandem
with ASARCO. 5 8
C. The Supreme Court's Opinions
The Supreme Court reversed in both cases and held in two six-to-
three decisions that the due process clause barred Idaho and New
Mexico from including any of the disputed income in the recipients'
50. Jurisdictional Statement at 6-7; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-4-8, -10 (Replacement Pam-
phlet 1981); see text at notes 33-36 supra.
51. In re Liability of F. W. Woolworth Co., refprintedin Jurisdictional Statement 30a-37a;
see text at note 40 supra.
52. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 95 N.M. 542, 545, 624 P.2d 51, 54 (Ct.
App. 1979) (citations omitted); see text at notes 41-42 supra.
53. Taxation and Revenue Dept. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 95 N.M. 519, 624 P.2d 28
(1981); see text at note 43 supra.
54. 95 N.M. at 526, 624 P.2d at 35.
55. 95 N.M. at 526, 624 P.2d at 35.
56. 95 N.M. at 526, 624 P.2d at 35.
57. 95 N.M. at 526-29, 624 P.2d at 35-38.
58. 102 S. Ct. 86 (1981).
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apportionable tax bases.5 9 Taken at face value, the Court's opinions
hardly warrant extended comment. In its view, the Court was
merely applying settled constitutional principles so recently articu-
lated in Mobil and Exxon to two sets of facts that happened to re-
quire a different result.60 Despite the Court's disclaimers, however,
several factors justify a more searching examination of the Court's
opinions and their implications. First, there is considerable question
whether the Court's opinions inASA RCO and Woolworth faithfully
adhere to the teachings of Mobil and Exxon. Second, whether they
do or not, the ASAJRCO and Woolworth opinions are important in
their own right as statements of the prevailing constitutional stan-
dards in this area. Third, the opinions will undoubtedly have a sig-
nificant impact on state administrative and judicial interpretations of
UDITPA, a development that deserves separate attention. Finally,
apart from any doctrinal import that the cases may have, they sug-
gest a judicial attitude toward state division-of-income rules at odds
with the attitude underlying its decisions in Mobil and Exxon. If the
Court's most recent opinions in this area accurately reflect its current
mood, the institutional consequences are likely to be strikingly dif-
ferent from those one might have anticipated from its opinions in
Mobil and Exxon. All of these matters will be taken up in the dis-
cussion that follows.
1. The Supreme Court's Opinion in ASARCO
a. The doctrinal issue. After dutifully reciting the principles set
forth in Mobil and Exxon, the Court described its task as determin-
ing whether, on the record before it, "ASARCO.. .has succeeded,
where the taxpayers in Mobil and Exxon failed, in proving that the
dividend payors at issue are not part of its unitary business, but
rather are 'discrete business enterprises.' "61 By thus stating the is-
sue, the Court disposed of the critical doctrinal question in the case:
whether the out-of-state payor must engage in a unitary business
with the nondomiciliary in-state payee to justify a state's inclusion in
the payee's apportionable tax base of income from intangibles it re-
ceives from the payor, as ASARCO contended; or whether a state
may justifiably include income from intangibles in the nondomicil-
59. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982); F. W. Woolworth
Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982). Justice Powell wrote both major-
ity opinions; Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, wrote both dis-
senting opinions; Chief Justice Burger wrote a brief concurring opinion in .4SARCO.
60. See, ag., ASA4RCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3114 n.22, 3116 n.24.
61. 102 S. Ct. at 3111.
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iary payee's apportionable tax base so long as the intangibles them-
selves are used in the payee's unitary business, regardless of the
underlying functional relationship between the out-of-state payor
and the in-state payee, as Idaho asserted.
Neither the vague command of the due process clause nor the
Court's opinions construing it spoke clearly to this issue. The due
process clause required both a minimal connection between the ac-
tivities of an interstate business and the taxing state as well as a ra-
tional relationship between the income attributed to the state and the
intrastate activities of the business.6 2 The unitary business principle
embodied the first limitation. The existence of a unitary business
establishes the minimum nexus that a state must have with the out-
of-state activities of a multijurisdictional business in order to justify
the state's taxing an apportioned share of all of the business income,
for if a multijurisdictional business is unitary the state has some con-
nection with all of it.63 The Court's decisions involving the unitary
business principle certainly permitted the apportionment of in-
tangibles64 and the income therefrom,6 5 as Idaho demonstrated.60
Yet they did not establish the proposition for which they were of-
fered - that the due process clause's criterion for apportionability of
income from intangibles is satisfied by "the fact that ASARCO's ac-
quisition, management and disposition of these intangible assets
were regular parts of ASARCO's own unitary business ....
None of the cases cited by Idaho involved the apportionment of in-
come received from payors with which the payee was not function-
ally integrated. By the same token, while the Court's opinion in
Mobil had approved the apportionment of income from intangibles
received from payors that were functionally integrated with the
62. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980).
63. See Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 121-27. At one point in its opinion inASARCO, the
Court seems to suggest that in the absence of a unitary business, there can be no rational
relationship between the income attributed to the state and the intrastate values of an enter-
prise. 102 S. CL at 3115. This may be true, but it is not terribly relevant. Once it has been
determined that no unitary business (Le., no minimal connection) exists justifying apportion-
ment of the income in question, inquiry into the rational relationship issue is unnecessary. On
the other hand, the determination that a business is unitary, thus justifying apportionment of
the income in question, leaves very much alive the issue whether the income is being appor-
tioned in a manner that satisfies the due process clause's rational relation requirement. See
Hellerstein, supra note I, at 127-30.
64. See, eg., Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897).
65. See, ag., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
66. Brief for Appellee at 9-17, ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Commn., 102 S. Ct. 3103
(1982).
67. Brief for Appellee at 9.
[Vol. 81:157
State Income Taxation,
payee,68 one would have been hard-pressed to derive from Mobil the
proposition advanced by ASARCO that functional integration be-
tween payor and payee is the sina qua non of apportionability of
income received by the latter from the former.6 9
Understandably, then, the Court in AS4RCO paid scant atten-
tion to its precedents in rejecting the contention that income from
intangibles may be apportioned so long as they contribute to the
payee's own unitary business carried on in part in the taxing state.
Characterizing Idaho's position as having "corporate purpose ...
define unitary business, '70 the Court invoked the internal logic of
the unitary business principle itself in refuting it:
This definition of unitary business would destroy the concept. The
business of a corporation requires that it earn money to continue oper-
ations and to provide a return on its invested capital. Consequently all
of its operations, including any investment made, in some sense can be
said to be "for purposes related to or contributing to the [corporation's]
business." When pressed to its logical limit, this conception of the
"unitary business" limitation becomes no limitation at all. When less
ambitious interpretations are employed, the result is simply arbitrary.71
The Court thus repudiated Idaho's argument that use of an intangi-
ble asset in a taxpayer's own unitary business makes income from
the asset apportionable.
It is not clear, however, to what extent the Court embraced
ASARCO's contention that functional integration between payor
and payee is a prerequisite to the apportionability of income from
intangibles received by a nondomiciliary payee. Statements in the
Court's opinion suggest, at least by negative inference, that func-
tional integration between payor and payee along with centralized
management and economies of scale are central to its conception of
a unitary business for purposes of determining the apportionability
of income from intangibles.72 The Court's analysis of the facts in the
case,73 moreover, lends additional credence to the view that the un-
derlying relationship between the activities of the payor and the
payee circumscribes the scope of a unitary business in the context of
income from intangibles. Furthermore, this is the way the dissent
68. Or, more accurately, from payors whose lack of functional integration with the payee
the taxpayer had failed to prove.
69. See Brief for Appellant at 13-18, ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., 102 S. Ct.
3103 (1982).
70. 102 S. Ct. at 3114 (emphasis in original).
71. 102 S. Ct. at 3114 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
72. 102 S. Ct. at 3115-16.
73. 102 S. Ct. at 3111-13; see text at notes 79-92 infra; see also F. W. Woolworth Co. v.
Taxation and Revenue Dept., 102 S. Ct. 3128, 3134-39 (1982).
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reads the majority's opinion, which it accuses of substituting an
"oversimplified test of active operational control ' 74 and functional
integration75 for the "multifaceted analysis used to determine
whether the businesses in Mobil Oil and Exxon were unitary."76 On
this understanding of the Court's opinion, it would follow that only
when the underlying business enterprises exhibit features of func-
tional integration, centralized management, or economies of scale
may income from intangibles be apportioned by a nondomiciliary
state inasmuch as the unitary business principle is the "linchpin of
apportionability in the field of state income taxation. '77
The Court, however, may not have intended to adopt ASARCO's
position without qualification. Despite the restrictive approach to
apportionability that emerges from ASAJRCO, language in the
Court's opinion can be construed as accommodating a more expan-
sive approach should the Court be persuaded to move in that direc-
tion.78 Whether the Court will adopt such an approach is likely to
depend on its perception of the facts before it, a matter to which we
now turn.
b. The factual issues. The Court's decision in ASAJRCO may
well have been informed more by its perception of the facts than by
its commitment to any particular definition of a unitary business.
Indeed, one suspects that the Court would have found that the due
process clause barred inclusion of the disputed income in
ASARCO's apportionable tax base even if it had construed the uni-
tary business principle more broadly for purposes of apportioning
income from intangibles. In stressing that none of the five payor
corporations in question was conducting a unitary business with
ASARCO, the Court referred to trial court findings that
"ASARCO's stock investments were 'not integral to nor a necessary
part of [ASARCO's] business operation,' "79 that ASARCO "has
never been required to utilize its stock as security for borrowing of
74. 102 S. Ct. at 3123 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
75. 102 S. Ct. at 3119 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
76. 102 S. Ct. at 3123 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980).
78. For example, the Court observed that "the application of the unitary-business principle
requires in each case a careful examination both of the way in which the corporate enterprise is
structured and operates, and of the relationship with the taxing state." 102 S. Ct. at 3115 n.22.
Inasmuch as future cases will bring before the Court corporate enterprises with structures,
operations, and relationships to the taxing state different from those addressed in ASARCO,
the Court is plainly leaving the door open for further refinement of its view of the unitary
business concept.
79. 102 S. Ct. at 3114 n.21 (quoting Jurisdictional Statement app. at 44a).
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working capital, acquiring stock or securities in other companies, or
to support any bond issues," 80 and that "ASARCO was found to
have 'sufficient cash flow from mining to provide operating capital
for all mining operations without reliance upon cash flow from...
income from intangibles.' "81 These facts would have supported a
determination that ASARCO's income from the payor corporations
was not apportionable even if the Court had articulated a unitary
business principle encompassing ASARCO's use of intangible assets,
such as working capital, that were integrally related to ASARCO's
unitary business.
The Court never suggested, however, that it had this point in
mind in its'review of the facts in ASARCO. Instead, it focused on
the functional and managerial relationships between the payor cor-
porations and ASARCO in determining the apportionability of the
dividends, interest, and capital gains in question. Southern Peru,
which was 51.5 percent owned by ASARCO, presented the "closest
question. '82 Although Southern Peru sold ASARCO 35 percent of
its output and was potentially subject to its control, the Court, after
examining the details of management contracts, cited trial court find-
ings and evidence to the effect that ASARCO did not "control
Southern Peru in any sense of that term. '8 3 It therefore concluded
that "ASARCO's Idaho silver mining and Southern Peru's autono-
mous business are insufficiently connected to permit the two compa-
nies to be classified as a unitary business." 84
The Court likewise concentrated its attention on the functional
and managerial links between the remaining out-of-state corpora-
tions and ASARCO in concluding that "the relationship of each of
the other four subsidiaries to ASARCO falls far short of bringing
any of them within its unitary business." 85 M.I.M., which was 52.7
percent 6wned by ASARCO, failed the test because it was never ac-
tually controlled 86 by ASARCO, operated "entirely independently
80. 102 S. Ct. at 3114 n.21 (quoting Jurisdictional Statement app. at 41a).
81. 102 S. Ct. at 3114 n.21 (quoting Jurisdictional Statement app. at 41a).
82. 102 S. Ct. at 3111.
83. 102 S. Ct. at 3112 (quoting Transcript of Proceedings in the District Court, reprintedin
Joint Appendix 121a). Southern Peru's managing board was composed of thirteen directors,
six of them named by ASARCO, six by the other shareholders, and the thirteenth by.either the
first twelve directors or unanimous agreement of the shareholders.
84. 102 S. Ct. at 3112.
85. 102 S. Ct. at 3112.
86. The Court acknowledged that ASARCO had the "control potential to manage M. L
M." 102 S. Ct. at 3113.
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of and ha[d] minimal contact with '8 7 ASARCO, and sold ASARCO
only 1 percent of its output. General Cable and Revere Copper,
which were 34 percent owned by ASARCO, were not unitary with
ASARCO because the intercompany purchases and sales never ex-
ceeded 6 percent of the totals involved,88 and "[n]either Revere's nor
General Cable's management seeks direction or approval from
ASARCO on operational or other management decisions."8 9 Fi-
nally, ASARCO Mexicana, which was 49 percent owned by
ASARCO, was not engaged in a unitary business with ASARCO
because there were only "insignificant" intercompany sales during
the years in question9" and Mexicana "operate[d] independently of
[ASARCO]."91
In sum, because an examination of ASARCO's functional and
managerial relationship with the out-of-state payors demonstrated to
the Court's satisfaction that they were not engaged in a unitary busi-
ness with ASARCO in the taxing state, the Court concluded that,
under the due process clause, none of ASARCO's income from in-
tangibles derived from its interests in these payors was
apportionable. 92
c. Concluding observations. Three further points warrant con-
sideration before we conclude the discussion of the Court's opinion
in ASA1RCO. First, the Court's treatment of the question whether
ASARCO and its subsidiaries engaged in a unitary business estab-
lished no bright lines for resolving this issue in the future. The Court
did, to be sure, reiterate and emphasize the guiding principles in its
opinion. No less than six times did the Court remind us in4SA4RCO
that proof of "discrete business enterprise" conducted by the out-of-
state payor will preclude the apportionability of dividends, interest,
and capital gains by the state in which a nondomiciliary payee con-
ducts its business;93 and the Court four times repeated the admoni-
87. 102 S. Ct. at 3113 (quoting Findings and Conclusions of the State District Court, re.
printedin Jurisdictional Statement app. at 43a).
88. See 102 S. Ct. at 3113 n.19.
89. 102 S. Ct. at 3113 (footnote omitted) (citing Transcript of Proceedings in the District
Court, reprinted in Joint Appendix 121a, 137a).
90. See 102 S. Ct. at 3113 n.21.
91. 102 S. Ct. at 3113 (quoting Findings and Conclusions of the State District Court, re-
printed in Jurisdictional Statement app. at 43a).
. 92. The Court agreed with Idaho and ASARCO that interest and capital gains income
ASARCO received from the out-of-state payors should be treated in the same manner as the
dividend income: "One must look principally at the underlying activity, not at the form of
investment, to determine the propriety of apportionability." 102 S. Ct. at 3116 (quoting Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 440 (1980)).
93. 102 S. Ct. at 3110, 3111, 3115, 3116 n.24.
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tion that the due process clause bars the apportionment of income
from intangibles when the business activities of the payor "have
nothing to do with the activities of the recipient in the taxing
State." a94 But emphasizing these phrases does not invest them with
content. In analyzing the facts, the Court did little more than state
them and pronounce its conclusion. Indeed, the Court took pains to
make clear that its decision was rooted in the particular facts of the
case before it.9 While one can derive some guidance for the future
from the Court's discussion of the facts,96 the Court's approach in
ASARCO seems to invite an endless stream of litigation over the
requisite flow of goods, services, personnel and so forth, that are nec-
essary to constitute a unitary business.
Second, the relationship inASAJRCO between the facts the Court
found to be dispositive and the factual premises underlying the los-
ing party's position produces an odd sense of dft vu. In Mobil, it
will be recalled,97 the taxpayer never sought to demonstrate that it
was not engaged in a unitary business with its subsidiaries, because
of its belief that the issue was irrelevant to the case. The Court, of
course, went on to rule against the taxpayer, hinging its decision on
the existence of such a unitary business. In ASARCO, Idaho con-
ceded that the out-of-state payors "were not engaged in a single uni-
tary business together with ASARCO" 98 and instead devoted its
energies to showing that ASARCO's acquisition, management, and
disposition of the intangibles were related to ASARCO's own uni-
tary business in the state. The Court, of course, went on to rule
against the state, hinging its decision on the absence of a unitary
business between the out-of-state payors and the in-state payee. In
both Mobil and ASARCO, then, we have the anomalous situation in
which the losing party never challenged the critical factual predicate
underlying the Court's holding, even though the predicate itself was
far from incontrovertible. 99
Third, the dissent leveled a number of criticisms at the Court's
view of both the law and the facts of the case which deserve brief
mention. It took issue with the Court's refusal to consider
ASARCO's relationship to its investments as part of ASARCO's uni-
94. 102 S. Ct. at 3110 (emphasis omitted); 102 S. Ct. at 3115; see 102 S. Ct. at 3116 n.24.
95. 102 S. Ct. at 3115 n.22, 3116 n.24.
96. See text at note 164 infia.
97. See text at note 17 supra.
98. Brief for Appellee at 29.
99. See 102 S. Ct. at 3117-24 (O'Connor, ., dissenting); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner
of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 460 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tary business, claiming that the Court in so doing had shrunk the
unitary business concept reflected in Mobil and Exxon "beyond all
recognition."' 100 Moreover, the dissent accused the Court of erring
"even in its fundamental determination that ASARCO's holdings
were passive investments unrelated to ASARCO's operational busi-
ness."'01 Where the majority found no significant managerial con-
trol by ASARCO of its subsidiaries and little significant interchange
of products, the dissent found that ASARCO "had effective opera-
tional control of at least three of the five subsidiaries," 10 2 and that
ASARCO's majority interest in Southern Peru Copper "evidently
helped to assure ASARCO of supplies of unrefined copper, since
35% of the entire copper output of Southern Peru was sold to
ASARCO."' 10 3 While it may be a matter of small moment, except to
the parties, whether the majority or the dissent more accurately por-
trayed the record, the considerable sparring in the opinions over the
proper perception of the facts and their constitutional implications 104
enhances the probability that the battle lines of future unitary busi-
ness controversies will be drawn over such factual issues. Finally,
the dissent expressed its dismay over its vision of the discordant con-
sequences of the Court's decision in a discussion that is more notable
for its novelty than its persuasiveness. 05
2. The Supreme Court's Opinion in Woolworth
Following on the heels of ASAIRCO, the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Woolworth reinforced AS4SARCO's essential lessons. In hold-
ing that New Mexico lacked the power under the due process clause
100. 102 S. Ct. at 3123 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent would have concluded that
ASARCO had failed to prove either that its investment decisionmaking was not part of its
unitary nonferrous metals business or that its investments were not part of the management of
the financial requirements of that business. 102 S. Ct. at 3118-22 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101. 102 S. Ct. at 3121 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
102. 102 S. CL at 3121 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
103. 102 S. Ct. at 3123 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
104. Compare 102 S. Ct. at 3113-16 & nn.21-24 with 102 S. Ct. at 3118-23 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
105. Thus, in suggesting a variety of imaginary horribles that might emanate from the
Court's decision, the dissent confuses principles developed under the Court's commerce clause
jurisprudence, which preclude states from imposing a multiple tax burden on interstate busi-
ness, see Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 130-37, with principles of due process, which permit the
states to tax income satisfying the minimum nexus and rational relation requirements, even
though this may result in double taxation. See Hellerstein, Some Reflections on the State Taxa-
tion ofa Nonresident'r Personal Income, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (1974). The dissent's
concern that the Court's decision will hamstring Congress in devising a legislative solution to
state division-of-income problems pursuant to its commerce power is out of touch with the
Court's views regarding the scope of congressional power under the commerce clause. See,
ag., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 275-83 (1981);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978).
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to include Woolworth's dividends in its apportionable tax base, the
Court reiterated that the "'linchpin of apportionability' for state in-
come taxation of an interstate enterprise is the 'unitary-business
principle.' " 06 It likewise reaffirmed that the fundamental inquiry
into the unitary business issue for purposes of determining the ap-
portionability of income from intangibles received by a nondomicil-
iary parent from an out-of-state payor depends on the "underlying
unity"107 between the payor's and payee's business activities, not on
whether "the non-domiciliary parent derives some economic benefit
- as it virtually always will - from its ownership of stock in an-
other corporation."108 The Court chided New Mexico, as it had
chided Idaho, for advancing a definition of a unitary business that
would, in the Court's view, emasculate the concept:
The state court's reasoning would trivialize this due process limitation
by holding it satisfied if the income in question "adds to the riches of
the corporation .... " Income, from whatever source, always is a
"business advantage" to a corporation. Our cases demand more. 109
Finally, the Court emphasized in Woolworth, as it had in ASARCO,
that potential as distinguished from actual control of the out-of-state
payor by the in-state payee does not suffice to establish a unitary
business relationship between them.110
Although Woolworth thus added little to the constitutional doc-
trine enunciated in AlSARCO, the Court's application of this doc-
trine to the facts in the case is more illuminating than its rather
conclusory factual analysis in ASARCO. The Court observed in
Woolworth that it had stressed three "factors of profitability" ' in
Mobil that arise from the "operation of a business as a whole" 1 2
and which "evidence the operation of a unitary business": 1 3 "func-
tional integration, centralization of management, and economies of
scale."'1 4 Though implicit in its opinion in ASARCO, the Court
106. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 102 S. Ct. 3128, 3134 (quoting
ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., 102 S. Ct. 3103, 3110 (1982)).
107. 102 S. Ct. at 3135 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,
440 (1980)).
108. 102 S. Ct. at 3135.
109. 102 S. Ct. at 3135 (citation omitted).
110. 102 S. Ct. at 3135-38; see text at note 86 supra.
111. 102 S. Ct. at 3135 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,
438 (1980)).
112. 102 S. Ct. at 3135 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,
438 (1980)).
113. 102 S. Ct. at 3135.




now depicted these factors in bold relief and proceeded to examine
the record in light of them.
In evaluating the relationship of Woolworth to its four dividend-
paying subsidiaries (three of which were wholly owned' 15), the Court
found little functional integration. Drawing a sharp distinction be-
tween the business of retailing, in which Woolworth and its subsidi-
aries exclusively engaged, and the vertically integrated petroleum
enterprises it had considered in Mobil and Exxon, the Court pointed
to evidence in the record indicating an absence of "centralized
purchasing, manufacturing, or warehousing of merchandise;"' 16 au-
tonomous decisionmaking by subsidiaries with respect to such mat-
ters as site selection, advertising, and accounting control;'" 7 and
independent responsibility by each subsidiary for obtaining financ-
ing.118 While the New Mexico Supreme Court found that there was
"some flow back and forth of goods"' 1 9 between parent and subsidi-
aries, the Court rejected this observation as unsupported by the rec-
ord. 20 The Court therefore concluded that "the record is persuasive
that Woolworth's operations were not functionally integrated with
its subsidiaries."'12 1
The Court similarly found little evidence of the existence of the
two other unitary business factors, centralization of management
and economies of scale. Each subsidiary operated as a distinct busi-
ness enterprise at the management level; there was little interchange
of personnel; each subsidiary enjoyed autonomy in retailing policy;
and Woolworth had no formal organizational mechanism for over-
seeing the operations of its foreign subsidiaries. 122 While there were
some managerial links, the Court discounted them as insignificant
when compared to the type of business integration it had encoun-
tered in Mobil and Exxon.1 3
Concluding that Woolworth and its four subsidiaries were there-
fore not engaged in a unitary business under the principles of Mobil,
Exxon, and ASARCO, the Court declared:
There is a critical distinction between a retail merchandising busi-
115. The other was 52.7 percent owned by Woolworth. See text at note 48 supra.
116. 102 S. Ct. at 3136.
117. 102 S. Ct. at 3135.
118. 102 S. Ct. at 3136.
119. Taxation and Revenue Dept. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 95 N.M. 519, 524, 624 P.2d 28,
33 (1981).
120. 102 S. Ct. at 3136 n.13.
121. 102 S. Ct. at 3136.
122. 102 S. Ct. at 3136-37.
123. 102 S. Ct. at 3137-38.
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ness as conducted by Woolworth and the type of multinational busi-
ness - now so familiar - in which refined, processed, or
manufactured products (or parts thereof) may be produced in one or
more countries and marketed in various countries, often worldwide. In
operations of this character there is a flow of international trade, often
an interchange of personnel, and substantial mutual interdependence.
The uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that Woolworth's interna-
tional retail business is not comparable. There is no flow of interna-
tional business. Nor is there any integration or unitary operation in
the sense in which our cases consistently have used these terms.124
In addition to the dividends at issue, New Mexico had sought to
include in Woolworth's apportionable tax base amounts that Wool-
worth was required to report as income on its federal income tax
return in order to claim the benefit of a foreign tax credit for taxes
paid by its dividend-paying subsidiaries. 125 This so-called dividend
"gross-up" is, in substance, the amount of foreign taxes paid by the
foreign subsidiary which "is treated [for this purpose] as a dividend
in the same manner as a dividend actually received by the domestic
corporation from a foreign corporation." 126 The Court summarily
disposed of New Mexico's claims:
In this case the foreign tax credit arose from the taxation by foreign
nations of Woolworth foreign subsidiaries that had no unitary business
relationship with New Mexico. New Mexico's effort to tax this income
"deemed received" - with respect to which New Mexico contributed
nothing - must also be held to contravene the Due Process Clause.12 7
II. STATE INCOME TAXATION OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
CORPORATIONs AFTER ASARCO AND WOOLWORTH
The evolution of constitutional standards governing state income
taxation of multijurisdictional corporations suggests that ASARCO
and Woolworth will have significant consequences beyond their nar-
row holdings. This Part explores the impact ofASARCO and Wool-
worth on the scope of the unitary business concept, the construction
of UDITPA, and the future of judicial intervention in conflicts over
state income taxation of multijurisdictional businesses.
A. The Scope of a Unitary Business
The Court's decisions in ASARCO and Woolworth have visibly
shaped the contours of the unitary business concept for purposes of
124. 102 S. Ct. at 3138-39 (footnote omitted).
125. See note 48 supra.
126. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. A83 (1962), quoted in 102 S. Ct. at 3139.
127. 102 S. Ct. at 3139 (footnote omitted).
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determining the apportionability of income from intangibles. Al-
though the Court purported merely to be applying familiar unitary
business principles articulated in Mobil and Exxon,128 the facts in
ASA1RCO and Woolworth required it to refine the guiding principles
to resolve the unitary business issues that they raised. Whereas Mo-
bil and its subsidiaries and Exxon's various functional departments
were engaged in a unitary business under almost any plausible ap-
proach to the concept, 29 neither ASARCO and its subsidiaries nor
Woolworth and its subsidiaries presented the easy case of the verti-
cally integrated business with a flow of goods, personnel, and serv-
ices among its constituent parts. The Court had instead to delineate
the limitations that the due process clause imposed on the apportion-
ability of income from intangibles received by a nondomidiliary cor-
poration from out-of-state subsidiaries with which it was not
vertically integrated.
In analyzing the issue in terms of the underlying functional and
managerial relationship between payor and payee, the Court ex-
pressly repudiated the sweeping unitary business definition offered
by the states which would have encompassed intangibles that in any
manner contribute to the economic benefit of the payee.130 The
Court was fully justified in thus narrowing the unitary business con-
cept. If the due process requirement of a "minimum connection"' 31
between the state and the income it may tax is to have any meaning
at all in this context, surely it must preclude taxation of the invest-
ment income that a nondomiciliary corporation receives, when the
only connection between the taxing state and the income is that the
corporation is a little bit richer for having received it. If this is all the
Court meant to say in ASARCO and Woolworth, we can only stand
back and applaud.
But the Court's opinions appear to go considerably further in
narrowing the unitary business definition for purposes of determin-
ing the apportionability of income from intangibles. By focusing ex-
clusively on the payor-payee relationship and denigrating a
definition embracing the use of the intangibles in the payee's own
unitary business, the Court's opinions at least by implication cast
doubt on the power of a state to include in a nondomiciliary payee's
apportionable tax base any income from intangibles received from
128. See ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., 102 S. Ct. 3103, 3114 n.22, 3116 n.24(1982).
129. See Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 148-51.
130. See text at notes 70-71 supra.
131. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
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an out-of-state payor with which the payee is not conducting a uni-
tary business.132
If this was what the Court meant to say in ASARCO and Wool-
worth, its opinions are objectionable on several grounds. First, it is
difficult to comprehend why the "minimal connection between...
[interstate] activities and the taxing State,"1 33 which is all the due
process clause requires at this stage of the inquiry, 134 should be
translated through the unitary business principle into a requirement
of an operational connection between the out-of-state and the in-
state enterprise for purposes of including income from intangibles in
the nondomiciliary payee's apportionable tax base. Such a restric-
tive view of the "definite link"'135 necessary to satisfy due process
strictures does not comport with the wide latitude the Court has gen-
erally accorded the states when the exercise of their taxing power is
challenged for lack of nexus. 36
Second, sound considerations of policy do not warrant such a
view. While the Court may properly have rejected as overbroad the
states' definition of a unitary business, there are less sweeping ap-
proaches, short of a requirement of functional integration and the
like, that would retain in a nondomiciliary payee's apportionable tax
base income from intangibles with which the state can legitimately
claim a palpable connection. It has been suggested, for instance, that
there are "a variety of situations in which dividends ought clearly to
be apportionable, both as a matter of due process of law and tax
policy, even though they are paid by corporations that are not part of
the taxpayer's unitary business conducted in the State."' 137 It will be
instructive to examine some examples of income from intangibles
that arguably should be apportionable, even though received from a
payor not functionally integrated with or actively controlled by the
payee, to raise the question whether a unitary business concept de-
fined by such criteria is defensible.
Income from short-term investments of working capital and
132. See notes 72-77 supra and accompanying text.
133. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978) (citation omitted).
134. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
135. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
136. See Hellerstein, Constitutional Limitations on State Tax Exportation, 1982 A.B.F. REs.
J. 1, 19-20.
137. Hellerstein, Allocation andApportionment of Dividends and the Delineation ofthe Uni-
tary Business, 14 TAx NoTEs 155, 159 (1982). [The ambiguities of Bluebook form may lead
the reader to believe that Professor Walter Hellerstein wrote this piece. While the other cita-
tions to "Hellerstein" in this Article are to works by Walter Hellerstein, the work cited here
was written by Jerome R. Hellerstein, Walter Hellerstein's father. - Ed.].
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other current funds held for ordinary operating uses has generally
been held to be apportionable without any requirement of functional
integration between payor and payee. 138 The rationale for including
such income in the payee's apportionable tax base is that it is an
integral part of the payee's unitary business carried on in part within
the taxing state.139 While the Court disparaged this rationale in
ASMRCO, 4° even ASARCO did "not contes[t] Idaho's right to treat
interest income from temporary deposits of [its] working capital
funds as apportionable business income derived in the ordinary
course of [its] Unitary Business activities."'1 41 There are, to be sure,
compelling reasons for excluding from a payee's apportionable tax
base income from intangibles having "nothing to do with the activi-
ties" 42 of the payee in the taxing state. Income from temporary in-
vestments employed in the ordinary course of the recipient's
operations in the taxing state, however, would hardly seem to fall
within the proscription. Yet a unitary business principle rooted in
the concept of functional integration of payor and payee or active
control of the former by the latter would in many cases preclude
apportionability of such income.
Income from intangibles falling within the Supreme Court's Corn
Products'43 doctrine represents another category of income which
often would not be apportionable under a unitary business definition
focused exclusively on the functional or managerial relationship be-
tween payor and payee. There is, however, a persuasive case for
holding such income apportionable. 144 In Corn Products Refining
Co. v. Commissioner145 the Supreme Court held that the gains and
losses incurred by a manufacturer of corn products from its purchase
and sale of corn futures gave rise to ordinary income and losses
rather than to capital gains and losses because the purchases and
138. See, ag., Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. Department of Revenue, 270 Or. 329, 527
P.2d 729 (1974).
139. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 276 Minn. 479, 151
N.W.2d 294 (1967).
140. 102 S. Ct. at 3114.
141. Brief for Appellant at 26.
142. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 442 (1980); see text at note
13 supra.
143. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
144. See Hellerstein, supra note 137, at 159. Idaho did not refer to the Corn Products
doctrine in its brief. New Mexico did cite Corn Products in its brief, but only in connection
with the apportionability of Woolworth's foreign exchange gain. See Brief for Appellee at 34,
Woolworth. The Court declined to consider New Mexico's treatment of this item, however,
because the "matter was not considered below. 102 S. Ct. at 3139-40 n.26; see note 48 supra.
145. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
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sales constituted an "integral part of its manufacturing business" 146
rather than "transactions in property which are not the normal
source of business income."' 147 Thus ordinary income or deductions
rather than capital gains or losses have been found in cases involving
sale of stock acquired to insure a source of supplies, 48 stock ac-
quired to obtain or protect a job, fees, or commissions,149 and stock
acquired to gain needed technology and personnel.150 The rationale
for these holdings is that the gains or losses arise from the ordinary
conduct of the taxpayer's business rather than from transactions in
capital investments for which preferential tax treatment is granted.
By analogy, income from transactions integrally related to a tax-
payer's business activities in a state should be includable in the re-
cipient's apportionable tax base because it possesses the "minimum
connection' 5' with the taxpayer's activities in the state required by
due process strictures. Such income has generally been held to be
apportionable without any requirement of functional integration or
centralized control of payor and payee.' 52 Yet the Court's opinions
inASARCO and Woolworth may be read to discredit these cases.' 53
One should not, of course, dismiss as idle the Supreme Court's
concern that the unitary business concept would be "destroy[ed]" if
it were interpreted to embrace the relationship between the business
use of an intangible asset and the income recipient's business in the
taxing state. 54 Nevertheless, tying the unitary business definition to
the underlying relationship of the payor's and payee's enterprises -
through functional integration, managerial control, or economies of
146. 350 U.S. at 51.
147. 350 U.S. at 52.
148. See, e.g., Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
149. See, eg., Steadman v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1970) (purchase by attor-
ney of corporate client's stock to protect position as general counsel).
150. See, e.g., Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.
1971).
151. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
152. See, e.g., W. R. Grace & Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 378 Mass. 577, 583, 393
N.E.2d 330, 334 (1979) (citing Corn Products).
153. The Court's disparaging remarks in Woolworth concerning the significance of the
hearing examiner's finding that Woolworth "had commingled its dividends with its general
funds and had used them for general corporate operating purposes," F. W. Woolworth Co. v.
Taxation and Revenue Dept., 102 S. Ct. 3128, 3135 n.l 1 (1982), may be read as supporting this
interpretation of the rule. The Court observed that
[t]his analysis.. . subverts the unitary business limitation. .41 dividend income - irre-
spective of whether it is generated by a "discrete business enterprise" - would become
part of a unitary business if the test were whether the corporation commingled dividends
from other corporations, whether subsidiaries or not..
102 S. Ct. at 3135 n.Il (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
154. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., 102 S. Ct. 3103, 3114 (1982).
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scale - is not an appropriate response.'55 This approach is not com-
pelled by the simple mandate of the due process clause that there be
"some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and
the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax."' 5 6 Nor is it con-
sistent with the respect for state taxing authority that the Court has
by and large accorded in this context.' 5 7 As for the problem of
drawing the line between intangibles that are and that are not suffi-
ciently related to the taxpayer's business in the state to justify inclu-
sion of the income therefrom in the payee's apportionable tax base,
"the great body of the law consists in drawing such lines... ,"158
and "the fact that a line has to be drawn somewhere does not justify
its being drawn anywhere."' 159 Indeed, as the Court in Mobil itself
had to remind the taxpayer who was advancing a restrictive rule al-.
locating income to a single situs to protect itself from possible abuses
of a rule of apportionment, the "argument underestimates the power
of this Court to correct excessive taxation .... ",160
Having said all this, we should recall that the preceding discus-
sion has assumed that the Court actually intended to inject a require-
ment of functional integration and centralized management into its
definition of a unitary business for purposes of including income
from intangibles in a nondomiciliary payee's apportionable tax
base.' 6' This is a plausible reading of the Court's opinion.' 62 It is
not, however, the only reading it may be given, a fact that may
render the preceding discussion more than academic. After all, the
155. It might be noted, however, that a unitary business concept focusing exclusively on
the underlying relationship of the payor to the payee would clearly be appropriate for pur-
poses of determining whether the state may require a group of corporations to file a combined
report for income tax purposes. See Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 121-30. In such cases, the
essential question is whether the state may treat the group of corporations as a single entity,
not whether particular items of income are includable in the apportionable tax base. Indeed,
under the combined approach, dividends, interest, and the like paid by one member of the
combined group to another member of the group are eliminated entirely from the calculation
of the group's combined income, which is determined by reference to income derived by mem-
bers of the group from dealings with nonmembers of the group. See id.; Keesling & Warren,
The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42, 59-60 (1960). In
A4SARCO and Woolworth, however, the unitary business issues before the Court were con-
cerned solely with the separate company approach to state corporate income taxation. See
Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 123-24. The Court will, however, soon have an opportunity to
confront the unitary business issues that arise in connection with the combined approach. See
note 214 iata.
156. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
157. See Hellerstein, supra note 1.
158. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
159. Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543, 558 (1942) (Frankfurter, ., dissenting).
160. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 447 (1980).
'161. See text at note 77 supra.
162. See text at notes 72-76 supra.
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Court, at least according to its understanding of the facts,1 63 was
dealing neither with income from short term investments used in the
taxpayer's operations in the state, nor with income falling within the
Corn Products doctrine, and the Court is not known for deciding
issues not before it. If the Court did not intend to limit the definition
of a unitary business along these lines, it should say so explicitly at
the next appropriate opportunity.
Beyond narrowing the unitary business principle to some yet-to-
be determined extent, the Court provided it with additional content,
although not as much as one might have desired. We now know, for
example, that functional integration, centralization of management,
and economies of scale are key factors in determining whether there
is a unitary or discrete business enterprise; that ownership by itself,
regardless of its extent, does not make one business unitary with an-
other; that potential as distinguished from actual managerial control
will not justify a finding of unity; that a flow of products, personnel,
and services among entities evidences the existence of a unitary busi-
ness and the lack thereof evidences its absence; and that the in-
terchange of some goods and the maintenance of some managerial
links between entities will not inexorably lead to the conclusion that
they are unitary.1" Whether this "guidance" will actually calm the
waters in this troubled area, however, is another question that is con-
sidered below.165
Finally, as the Court emphasized in Woolworth and ASARCO,
the scope of a unitary business, while delineated by general princi-
ples, is ultimately defined by particular facts of particular cases.
"[Tihe application of the unitary-business principle requires in each
case a careful examination both of the way in which the corporate
enterprise is structured and operates, and of the relationship with the
taxing state."' 66 The Court's insistence that "these cases are decided
on their facts in light of established general principles"' 67 cannot, to
be sure, obscure its confrontation and resolution of critical doctrinal
issues in the course of reaching its decisions. Still, the Court's ap-
proach to the unitary business issue in ASARCO and Woolworth,
with its painstaking scrutiny of the record, leaves one with the sense
that whatever the broad principles to which it pays homage, the uni-
tary business in the end may simply be something that the Court
163. See text at notes 79-81 supra.
164. See text at notes 79-92 & 107-20 supra.
165. See text at notes 204-08 infra.
166. Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3138 n.22.
167. AS,4RCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3116 n.24.
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knows when it sees it.168 Like other protean concepts with which the
Court has had to grapple, the unitary business principle may there-
fore elude definition with intellectually satisfying precision.
B. The Uniform Division of Incomefor Tax
Purposes Act (UDITPA)
As noted at the outset of this Article, 169 the constitutional issues
considered by the Court inAS4SARCO and Woolworth closely tracked
the state statutory issues that arose under UDITPA in the state ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings. The question of the appor-
tionability of ASARCO's and Woolworth's income under UDITPA
depended on whether it was business income, which meant
income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of
the taxpayer's trade or business and includes income from tangible and
intangible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of
the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or
business operations.' 70
In the state proceedings, it will be recalled,' 7' the lower courts con-
cluded that the disputed income was nonbusiness income allocable
to the taxpayer's commercial domicile. The state supreme courts re-
versed these decisions and held that the income was business income
apportionable in part to the nondomiciliary state in which the tax-
payer was doing business. When the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the due process clause forbade Idaho and New Mexico
from including the disputed income in ASARCO's and Woolworth's
apportionable tax bases, it effectively overturned the state court de-
terminations that such income was business income under
UDITPA.172
Needless to say, it is not novel doctrine that state law must yield
to federal constitutional imperatives. Hence there would ordinarily
be little justification in pursuing a question of state law that raised a
definitively adjudicated federal constitutional issue except, perhaps,
to observe that its future application must conform to the federal
mandate. There are, however, at least two reasons why UDITPA's
168. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing
pornography).
169. See text following note 45 supra.
170. UDITPA § l(a). UDITPA's approach to dividing the income of a multijurisdictional
business is considered more fully in the text at notes 6-7 & 26-31 supra.
171. See text at notes 41-42 & 52 supra.
172. Of course, it did not actually hold that the income in question was therefore non-
business income allocable to the state designated by UDITPA. See UDITPA §§ l(e), 4-8; text
at notes 17 & 26-31 supra.
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business/nonbusiness income distinction warrants some further
comment. First, since UDITPA is in force in most of the states with
corporate income taxes, its construction has unusually broad signifi-
cance when compared to the typical state statute. Second, the
Court's implicit gloss on UDITPA's business/nonbusiness income
distinction represents a major defeat for the Multistate Tax Commis-
sion, which in recent years has been advancing, with considerable
success, its expansive views of apportionability through its interpre-
tation and administration of UDITPA.
173
In order to avoid constitutional difficulties, state courts and ad-
ministrative agencies charged with the responsibility of distinguish-
ing business from nonbusiness income under UDITPA will
presumably construe the distinction consistently with the principles
articulated by the Supreme Court inASARCO and Woolworth. Al-
though the language of UDITPA plainly embraces a payee-focused
approach to apportionable business income - "income from...
intangible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition
of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's regular
trade or business" 174 - this is precisely the approach that the Court
disapproved in ASARCO and Woolworth. One would anticipate, at
a minimum, that state courts and agencies will interpret the business
income concept as not including income from intangibles merely be-
cause they "contribute to or relate to or are in some way in further-
ance of the taxpayer's own trade or business" 175 or because they
"ad[d] to the riches of the corporation." 176 When these are the only
grounds asserted for classification of income from intangibles as
business income under UDITPA, one would expect state courts and
agencies to hold that the income was nonbusiness income specifically
allocable to the commercial domicile or other state designated by
UDITPA.1 77 With respect to income from intangibles that is more
closely connected to the day-to-day operations of the taxpayer's
business, such as income from working capital and income falling
within the Corn Products doctrine, we are more likely to find state
courts and agencies giving the UDITPA business income definition
its natural reading and holding that such income is apportionable.
State courts and agencies will not, in my judgment, ignore statutory
173. See note 37 supra.
174. UDITPA § 1(a).
175. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., 102 S. Ct. 3103, 3114 (1982) (quoting
Transcript of Oral Argument at 25).
176. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 102 S. Ct. 3128, 3135 (1982)
(quoting Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 70 (1920)).
177. UDITPA §§ l(e), 4-8.
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language, abandon precedents, 178 and disregard sound considera-
tions of policy 179 unless and until they receive more definitive in-
struction from the Supreme Court to do so.
The Multistate Tax Commission, which has been the driving
force behind expansive interpretations of UDITPA's business in-
come definition, will likewise have to make some adjustments in its
approach, if not in its rhetoric. Both Idaho and New Mexico, after
all, had adopted the MTC's regulations, which took the most gener-
ous view of dividends that fell within UDITPA's definition of appor-
tionable business income, namely, dividends
where the stock with respect to which the dividends are received arises
out of or was acquired in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or
business operations or where the purpose for acquiring and holding the
stock is related to or incidental to such trade or business operations. 180
The Supreme Court flatly repudiated this approach to
apportionability.
Spokesmen for the MTC will also have to trim their extravagant
assertions that the path to clearing up confusion in this area lies in
"treating all corporate income as apportionable business income."'' 1
Flush from a string of victories 18 2 in the Supreme Court 83 and in
state tribunals,'14 the MTC anticipated further success in AS4RCO
and Woolworth 8s but must now confront reality and undertake the
task of revising its policy and rewriting its regulations to bring its
interpretation of UDITPA into line with constitutional limitations.
178. See notes 138-39 & 152 supra and accompanying text.
179. See text at notes 137-52 supra.
180. Multistate Tax Commission Regulation IV.25(4), reprinted in ST. &Loc. TAX SERV.
(P-H) (All States Unit) 6130, at 6104-05 (1973) (emphasis added); Idaho Income Tax Regula-
tions 27.IV.1(c)(4), reprinted in ST. & Loc. TAX SERV. (P-H) (Idaho) 11,676-H.55, at 11,624(1974); New Mexico Income Tax Regulations IT Reg. 17(b)(4), reprinted in ST. &Loc. TAX
SERv. (P-H) (New Mexico) 11,212.20, at 11,204 (1974).
181. Dexter, Taxation of Income From Intangibles of Multistate-Mulinatlonal Corpora-
tions, 29 VAND. L. Rxv. 401, 407 (1976). The author was and still is General Counsel to the
MTC. See also Dexter, Tax Apportionment of the Income of a Unitary Business: An Examina-
tion of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 107;
Corrigan, Mobil-izing Interstate Taxation, 15 TAX NoTS 803 (1981). The author of the last
article cited was and still is Executive Director of the MTC.
182. Except for those cases involving its own authority, see, e.g., United States Steel Corp.
v. Multistate Tax Commn., 434 U.S. 452 (1978), the MTC has technically been involved in the
cases cited in notes 183-84 infra only as an amicus curiae.
183. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978);
United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commn., 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
184. See, eg., Quails v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 266 Ark. 207, 585 S.W.2d 18 (1979);
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Dolan, 198 Colo. 413, 601 P.2d 628 (1979); Coming Glass Works v.
Department of Revenue, 616 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).




While the MTC's General Counsel predicted that if the taxpayers
prevailed in ASARCO and Woolworth "the state corporate income
tax system, which is dependent upon the unitary business principle,
would be left in a shambles,"' 86 what he really meant was that the
MTC's view of the unitary business principle would be left in a
shambles. The state corporate income tax system will survive the
Court's decisions limiting state tax authority just as interstate busi-
ness has survived the Court's decisions expanding it187 in the face of
taxpayers' dire predictions of its imminent demise.'88
C. The Courtfs Role in Adjudicating Controversies over State
Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations
Beyond the matter of how the latest turn in precedent or twist in
doctrine will affect the principles of adjudication in this area, the
Court's decisions inASA.RCO and Woolworth raise more fundamen-
tal questions about the Court's perception of its own role in resolving
controversies over state income taxation of multijurisdictional corpo-
rations. For a number of years now, the Court's opinions addressed
to state division-of-income problems have generally reflected a
hands-off attitude toward exercises of state tax power. 189 Its recent
decisions appeared to reaffirm this attitude. The Court displayed a
remarkably relaxed view of its role in policing constitutional chal-
lenges to state division-of-income rules in its 1978 opinion in Moor-
man Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,190 which sustained Iowa's single-
factor sales formula for apportioning net income. In upholding over
due process and commerce clause objections the very formula it had
harshly criticized thirteen years earlier when invalidating the District
of Columbia's apportionment provision on statutory grounds, 191 the
Court stressed the broad leeway the states enjoy in their choice and
implementation of apportionment formulas as well as its own nar-
row function in reviewing them. It declared that "a formula-pro-
duced assessment will only be disturbed when the taxpayer has
186. Id. at 867.
187. See, eg., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959).
188. See, eg., State Taxation on Interstate Commerce: Hearings Before the Senate Select
Comm on Small Business, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. pts. 1 & 2 passim (1959) (reacting to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959)).
189. See Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 115.
190. 437 U.S. 267 (1978). Moormnan is discussed in Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 132-35,
143-44, 146.48.
191. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
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proved by 'clear and cogent evidence' that the income attributed to
the State is in fact 'out of all appropriate proportion to the business
transacted. . in that State,' or has 'led to a grossly distorted re-
sult.'- 192 The Court also observed that even if a taxpayer could
demonstrate that the interaction of two apportionment formulas sub-
jected it to duplicative taxation, no issue of constitutional magnitude
would be raised because the Constitution did not require the states to
adopt uniform rules for the division of a multijurisdictional firm's
income.193 Finally, the Court urged taxpayers unhappy with the
consequences of its noninterventionist approach to seek relief from
Congress rather than the Court. 194
These themes - wide latitude for the states in dividing the in-
come of a multijurisdictional enterprise, self-restraint by the Court
in overseeing state initiatives for dealing with this task, and defer-
ence to Congress as the appropriate body for drawing definitive
guidelines in this domain - firmly underpinned the Court's deci-
sions two years later in Mobil and Exxon. 195 In the course of its
opinions in these cases, the Court stressed the freedom the states en-
joyed in apportioning a multijurisdictional corporation's income "in
order to obtain a 'rough approximation' of the corporate income that
is 'reasonably related to the activities conducted within the taxing
State' ";196 it emphasized that its own role was confined to assuring
that the corporation's tax liability was not "out of all appropriate
proportion to the business transacted by the [taxpayer] in th[e]
State"; 97 and it adverted to the preemptive role that Congress might
play in providing uniform rules governing division of income among
192. 437 U.S. at 274 (citations omitted).
193. 437 U.S. at 277-80.
194. 437 U.S. at 280.
195. There was an intervening decision after Moornan and before Mobil and Exxon that
might have been read as embodying a more vigilant attitude toward state division-of-income
problems than that reflected in Moorman, Mobil, and Exxon. In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County
of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), the Court struck down a local property tax on Japanese
cargo containers whose full value had already been taxed in Japan. The Court held that a
state lacks power under the commerce clause to impose even a fairly apportioned, nondiscrim-
inatory property tax upon foreign-owned and foreign-based instrumentalities of foreign com-
merce used exclusively in furtherance of such commerce. In Mobil, however, the Court gave
Japan Line a narrow reading, noting, among other things, that the case was concerned with the
division of a property-tax base as distinguished from an income-tax base and that it was con-
cerned solely with foreign commerce, where the constitutional rules governing state taxation
differ from the rules governing state taxation of interstate commerce. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Com-
missioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 448 (1980). Japan Line is discussed in Hellerstein, supra note
1, at 137-39.
196. Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207,223 (1980) (quoting Moorman,
437 U.S. at 273).
197. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980) (quoting Hans




As the preceding discussion has indicated, the Court's opinions in
ASARCO and Woolworth reflect a strikingly different judicial per-
spective on state division-of-income issues. No longer are we told
that the essential question is whether the state's apportionment
formula has produced a "grossly distorted result"199 or one "out of
all appropriate proportion to the business transacted .. .in th[e]
State."2°° Instead of a detached judicial tolerance for inferences a
state is "entitled" to draw from the record,20' we find the Court im-
mersing itself in the factual details of the state administrative pro-
ceedings and rejecting state court inferences with which it
disagrees. 202 One aspect of the Exxon and Woolworth decisions dra-
matically illustrates the contrasting approaches between the two sets
of cases. In Exxon, the Court relied upon the fact that Exxon's Wis-
consin taxable income was merely 0.22 percent of the total company
net income as compared to the 0.41 percent of its sales in the state in
order to justify the conclusion that the Wisconsin levy was not "out
of all appropriate proportion to business transacted .. . in that
State. '203 In Woolworth; the Court paid no attention to a similar
comparison which showed that Woolworth's New Mexico taxable
income was 0.46 percent of the total company net income as com-
pared to the 0.52 percent of its sales in the state.204
One could, perhaps, explain the difference in the Court's ap-
proach in cases like loorman, Mobil, and Exxon, on the one hand,
and ASARCO and Woolworth, on the other, by distinguishing be-
tween the issues of fair apportionment and apportionability. In
Moorman, Mobil, and Exxon, it might be contended, the Court was
dealing with businesses that were easily found (or assumed 2 5) to be
unitary, and the Court's permissive attitude was limited to the fair-
ness of the apportionment of clearly apportionable unitary business
income. In ASARCO and Woolworth, by contrast, the critical ques-
tion was whether there was a unitary business whose income could
198. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 448-49 (1980).
199. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Commn., 390 U.S. 317, 326 (1968).
200. Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina ex reZ Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931).
201. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980).
202. See text at notes 119-20 supra.
203. Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 227 (1980) (quoting Hans
Rees' Sons v. North Carolina ex re. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931)).
204. Brief for Appellee at 5 n.10, F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept,
102 S. CL 3128 (1982).
205. In Moorman, it was never suggested that the income at issue was not derived from a
unitary business conducted in part in the taxing state, and the Court plainly assumed that
Moorman'sincome was derived from a unitary business.
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constitutionally be apportioned at all. The Court had not, it might
be suggested, ever taken a particularly indulgent approach to this
issue in part because it had rarely had occasion to address any hard
cases raising it. This explanation, however, fails to account ade-
quately for the unmistakable contrasts in the two sets of cases be-
tween the Court's tone, its willingness to scrutinize the states' view of
the facts, and its desire to defer the matters at issue to congressional
resolution.
In any event, whatever the scope of ASARCO's and Woolworth's
implications, they reflect an attitude of judicial vigilance un-
characteristic of the Court's recent opinions in this area. The Court's
posture in these cases may well have two significant institutional
consequences. First, as intimated above,206 the Court's preoccupa-
tion with the facts inASARCO and Woolworth is likely to generate a
flood of litigation over the definition of a unitary business. Although
the Court has provided us with some guidance in this area, a little
knowledge is a dangerous thing. Thus while we know that "a con-
tinuous flow and interchange of common products" are "essential
factors" in the unitary business definition,207 we also know that a
flow of goods of up to 35 percent of a company's output was insuffi-
cient to bring it within the definition.20 8 There will soon be cases
raising the question whether 40 or 45 or 50 percent is sufficient, espe-
cially in view of other distinguishing features of future cases that will
no doubt be brought to light. While we know that "one or several
common directors" and "irregular in-person" contacts between the
management of a parent and its subsidiaries do not suffice to make
their relationship a unitary one,20 9 suppose there are a majority of
common directors and more frequent in-person contacts. The
Court's abandonment of its catholic approach to the unitary business
concept 210 in favor of a narrower approach emphasizing the particu-
lar facts of the case is virtually certain to create an outpouring of
litigation, some of which will inevitably end up in its own lap.
Second, the Court's decisions in ASA44RCO and Woolworth will
probably undermine efforts to forge a legislative solution to state di-
vision-of-income problems. After all, the Court's decisions in cases
like Moorman, Mobil, and Exxon provided the stimulus for renewed
206. See text at notes 95-96 supra.
207. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comnn., 102 S. Ct. 3103, 3116 n.24 (1982).
208. 102 S. Ct. at 3112.
209. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 102 S. Ct. 3128, 3137-38
(1982).
210. See Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 148-51.
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congressional interest in these questions.211 The historical record in
this area, moreover, suggests that an expansive Supreme Court deci-
sion supplies a necessary impetus to the enactment of legislation the
very mention of which evokes immediate and vigorous opposition by
states seeking to avoid any federal statutory restraint on their taxing
authority.212 Despite the recent call by the General Accounting Of-
fice, a nonpartisan arm of Congress, for congressional intervention
in this field,213 ASARCO and Woolworth may, at least for the mo-
ment,214 lull Congress into the belief that the Court is actively en-
gaged in the task of overseeing and, when necessary, curbing the
states' endeavors to divide the income of multijurisdictional
corporations.
CONCLUSION
The first installment of this Article concluded by observing that
"[i]n Mobil and Exxon, state taxing authorities took on two of the
nation's three largest industrial corporations and emerged from the
judicial arena with resounding victories. '2 15 It suggested that the
Court had reaffirmed the states' broad power to tax multijurisdic-
tional business, had underscored its own limited role in keeping that
power within constitutional bounds, and had consequently made
congressional intervention in this area more likely. InASARCO and
Woolworth, by contrast, the Court unequivocally rebuffed state tax-
ing authorities in their efforts to tax two of the nation's other large
enterprises.216 The doctrine articulated by the Court in its latest at-
tempts to delineate the constitutional restraints on the states' power
to tax a multijurisdictional corporation's income has refined. in im-
211. See id. at 154-71.
212. See id. at 115.
213. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFicE, KEY ISSUES AFFECTING STATE TAXATION OF MUL-
TIJURXSDICTIONAL CORPORATE INCOME NEaD RESOLVING (1982) (Report to the Chairman,
House Comm. on Ways and Means).
214. As this Article went to press, the Court was considering two cases involving state
taxation of multijurisdictional corporations' income. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 84
IlM 2d 102,417 N.E.2d 1343 (1981),prob.Arur. noted, 102 S. Ct. 564 (1981), restored to calendar
for reargumnent, 102 S. Ct. 2032 (1982); Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 117
Cal. App. 3d 988, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1981),prob.juri. noted, 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982). In both
cases, taxpayers are challenging the states' power to require the filing of a combined report.
See notes 38 & 155 supra and sources cited therein. Since the constitutional predicate to filing
a combined report is the existence of a unitary business between the taxpaying corporation and
its subsidiaries or affiliates, see note 155 supra, the Court will have an opportunity to clarify its
views on a number of the matters discussed here.
215. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 171.
216. ASARCO was the nation's 234th largest industrial corporation in 1981. See FOR-
TUNE, May 3, 1982, at 268. Woolworth was the nation's sixth largest retailer in 1981. See
FORTUNE, July 12, 1982, at 140.
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portant respects the permissive approach reflected in Mobil and Ex-
xon. More significantly, the Court's opinions in ASARCO and
Woolworth bespeak a more active role for the Court than it has pre-
viously played in scrutinizing state division-of-income methods. If
the Court's most recent opinions accurately measure its willingness
to police state corporate income taxation, it will soon find a steady
diet of these cases on its docket and may well remove the incentive
for Congress to legislate in this domain.
